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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Jonathan Davis, a minor, and his mother and legal 
guardian, Wendy Davis, appeal the dismissal of Counts I 
through III of their complaint asserting claims against the 
Philadelphia Housing Authority under three separate 
theories of liability. The Davises argue that the district 
court erred by concluding they lacked prudential standing 
to pursue their claims because their rights were not within 
the "zone of interests" intended to be protected by Congress 
under the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 4821 et seq. ("Lead Act"). We agree and will reverse 




Beginning in approximately July 1993, the Davises 
rented an apartment from Miriam Shaw. While living in the 
apartment, Jonathan Davis was exposed to peeling and 
chipping lead-based paint which caused him to suffer lead 
poisoning and severe, permanent injury. As a result of 
Jonathan's poisoning, Wendy Davis incurred medical 
expenses and allegedly experienced mental distress. 
 
Before the Davises rented the apartment, it had been 
inhabited by a woman with a child under the age of seven. 
During that time, the apartment was part of a low-income 
rental program entitled Section 8.1 The Section 8 program 
is administered by the Housing Authority within the City of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In its brief, the Housing Authority concedes that Miriam Shaw 
participated as a landlord in the Section 8 program from the beginning 
of 1986 through sometime in 1992. 
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Philadelphia and subsidizes the rents of low-income tenants 
within the private housing market. Section 8 housing 
assistance is provided by the federal government and 
authorized by federal legislation enacted, inter alia, "to 
assist the several States and their political subdivisions to 
remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and 
the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings 
for families of lower income. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1437. To 
obtain the housing assistance funding, the Housing 
Authority enters into an Annual Contributions Contract 
with the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. 
 
Under the Lead Act and its implementing regulations, all 
existing housing which receives housing assistance 
payments under a program administered by HUD, or 
otherwise receives more than $5,000 in project-based 
assistance under a federal housing program, is subject to 
lead inspection and abatement procedures. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4822; 24 C.F.R. § 882.109(i); 24 C.F.R. § 35.24. These 
procedures are intended "to eliminate as far as practicable 
the hazards of lead-based paint poisoning" with respect to 
the covered housing. Id. It is clear that the Section 8 
program administered by the Housing Authority falls under 
the requirements of the Lead Act. It is equally clear that, 
under the Lead Act and its implementing regulations, the 
Housing Authority, as a condition of receiving federal 
funding for low-income housing assistance, has a duty to 
inspect Section 8 apartments for hazards resulting from 
lead-based paint and to ensure that any such hazards are 
eliminated as far as practicable. 42 U.S.C. § 4822(a)(1); 24 
C.F.R. § 882.109(i); 24 C.F.R. § 35.24(4). 
 
Following Jonathan's injuries, the Davises filed a civil 
action, alleging federal and state law causes of action 
against both the Housing Authority and Miriam Shaw. 
Counts I through III of the complaint asserted claims 
against the Housing Authority under three separate 
theories of liability: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) liability to third 
party beneficiaries for breach of contract; and (3) direct 
private rights of action.2 In response, the Housing Authority 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Davises did not challenge the dismissal of Count IV of their 
complaint (state law negligence claim) before the district court and do 
not raise the issue before us. Accordingly, we review only the dismissal 
of Counts I through III of the complaint. 
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filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that 
the Davises lacked prudential standing to assert their 
claims because their rights were not within the "zone of 
interests" intended to be protected by the Lead Act. 
 
The district court agreed and held that the Davises did 
not have standing to assert their claims against the 
Housing Authority. The court reasoned that "[b]ecause 
Plaintiffs are not participants in the Section 8 housing 
assistance program, their interests are not consistent with 
the purpose implicit in the statute at issue. . . . Plaintiffs do 
not have standing to pursue the claims at issue due to 
their lack of Section 8 status." Davis v. Philadelphia Hous. 
Auth., No. 96-1665, 1996 WL 377189, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 





At the outset, we note the limited scope of the issue we 
are asked to review; namely, whether the district court 
erred by dismissing the Davis's claims for lack of standing.4 
This issue is analytically distinct from the related question 
of whether the Lead Act provides Section 8 participants or 
their successor tenants with either an express or implied 
cause of action against the Housing Authority for an alleged 
breach of its duties to inspect for lead-based hazards and 
to ensure the removal of such hazards in apartment units 
which are, or at some time were, part of the Section 8 
program. In Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1151 n.10 
(3d Cir. 1982), we explicitly noted the distinction between a 
dismissal of a claim for lack of standing based on a failure 
to satisfy the zone of interests test and a dismissal for 
failure to state a cause of action. There we stated: 
 
When the question is whether any plaintiffs are entitled 
to relief under a statute which does not expressly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Davis's state law claims against Miriam Shaw were dismissed by 
a separate order. 
 
4. We exercise plenary review. UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. United 
States Postal Service, 66 F.3d 621, 624 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), 
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1261. 
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provide the relief which is sought, the question is 
properly framed as whether a cause of action can be 
implied. The court must in that case decide whether a 
newly-fashioned remedial structure should be made 
available to a class of litigants not expressly entitled to 
relief under the statute. 
 
In contrast, when there already exists a cause of action 
prescribing a particular remedy for a defined class of 
persons and the question is simply whether a 
particular plaintiff is also entitled to that relief, the 
question is properly addressed as one of standing. In 
such a case, the inquiry focuses on whether the 
plaintiff is the proper person to press the claim. 
 
Id. at 1151 n.10 (citations omitted). In the present action, 
the district court dismissed the Davis's claims against the 
Housing Authority solely on its conclusion that the Davises 
did not have standing because their interests "are not 
consistent with the purposes implicit in the statute at 
issue." Davis, 1996 WL 377189, at *3. Accordingly, we need 
not reach the separate question of whether the Lead Act 
provides the Davises, as successor tenants, with a cause of 





Turning squarely to the issue of standing, it is 
undisputed that the Davises were not participants in the 
Section 8 program at the time they rented the apartment 
from Miriam Shaw. It is also undisputed, however, that the 
prior tenants in the apartment were, and therefore during 
that period the Housing Authority was obligated to perform 
inspection duties and to ensure that abatement procedures 
took place pursuant to the Lead Act and its implementing 
regulations. These facts present us with the central 
question we must address: whether successor tenants, who 
move into an apartment that is no longer part of a federal 
housing program yet are injured as the result of an alleged 
breach of duty that occurred while the apartment was part 
of the program, are arguably within the class of persons 
that Congress intended to benefit under the federal statute 
 
                                5 
at issue. Put another way, are the Davis's rights arguably 
within the "zone of interests" intended to be protected by 
Congress under the Lead Act? We conclude that they are 
and hence, that the district court erred by dismissing the 
Davis's claims against the Housing Authority based on a 




The Supreme Court has established three elements 
necessary to satisfy "the irreducible constitutional 
minimum of standing": 
 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in 
fact" -- an invasion of a legally protected interest which 
is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, 
there must be a causal connection between the injury 
and the conduct complained of . . . . Third, it must be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The district court distinguished between the Davises asserting their 
claims as "successor tenants" and asserting their claims as "non-Section 
8 tenants." While it is unclear from the court's opinion what relevant 
difference it believed this distinction captured, we endorse its distinction 
because we believe there is an important difference between the two 
terms based on the facts of this case. 
 
Asserting their claims as "successor tenants" to a previous Section 8 
tenant means that the Davises were arguably entitled to a reasonable 
expectation that the Housing Authority had performed its inspection 
duties and ensured that abatement procedures had been undertaken as 
mandated under the Lead Act since the apartment had previously been 
part of a federal housing assistance program. In contrast, not every 
"non-Section 8 tenant" could reasonably claim the same expectation. For 
example, it is hard to imagine that a "non-Section 8 tenant" who moves 
into a building that has never been part of a federal housing program 
could assert a claim for breach of duty against the Housing Authority 
under the Lead Act when there was never an obligation on the part of 
the Housing Authority to inspect and to ensure the abatement of the 
apartment in the first place. As such, we are persuaded that it is more 
reasonable for "successor tenants" to a Section 8 tenant, like the 
Davises, to claim that their rights fall within the zone of interests covered 
by the statutory requirements imposed on the Housing Authority under 
the Lead Act than it is for generic, "non-Section 8 tenants" to make the 
same claim. 
 
                                6 
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision. 
 
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560- 
61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992)); accord Stehney v. Perry, 
101 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1996). Here, there is no dispute 
that these constitutional standing requirements are met. 
The Davis's claims allege: (1) a concrete harm that has 
already occurred; (2) caused by the Housing Authority's 
breach of duty to inspect and to ensure abatement; (3) that 
is redressible by monetary damages to offset medical 
expenses and mental distress incurred as the result of the 
harm caused.6 
 
In addition to the constitutional standing requirements, 
federal courts have developed prudential standing 
considerations "that are part of judicial self-government." 
UPS Worldwide, 66 F.3d at 626 (citation omitted). These 
considerations require that 
 
(1) a litigant assert his [or her] own legal interests 
rather than those of third parties, (2) courts refrain 
from adjudicating abstract questions of wide public 
significance which amount to generalized grievances, 
and (3) a litigant demonstrate that her interests are 
arguably within the zone of interests intended to be 
protected by the statute, rule or constitutional 
provision on which the claim is based. 
 
Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 538 (3d Cir. 
1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted); accord 
Stehney, 101 F.3d at 930; UPS Worldwide, 66 F.3d at 626. 
The purpose of these prudential standing requirements is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In its brief, the Housing Authority half-heartedly argues that the 
Davis's claims are inadequate to satisfy the minimums for constitutional 
standing because the complaint fails to specify a request for money 
damages aside from attorney's fees. The clear intent of the complaint, 
however, is to seek monetary damages for actual injuries suffered. In 
view of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f) which provides that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so 
construed as to do substantial justice," the complaint appears to 
sufficiently allege the necessary elements for Article III standing. See, 
e.g., Budinsky v. Commonwealth of Penn. Dept. Env. Resources, 819 F.2d 
418, 421 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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"to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where 
no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access 
to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert 
a particular claim." Wheeler, 22 F.3d at 538 (citations 
omitted). Here, it is clear that the Davis's claims meet the 
first two prudential standing requirements: the Davises are 
asserting their own interests and are claiming violations of 
concrete statutory and regulatory rights. See Stehney, 101 
F.3d at 931. Thus, the remaining question is whether the 
Davis's interests are arguably within the "zone of interests" 





The Supreme Court first formulated the zone of interests 
test in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S. Ct. 827, 829-30 (1970). In 
Data Processing, sellers of data processing services 
challenged a Comptroller of the Currency ruling that 
permitted national banks to offer data processing services 
to their customers. The plaintiffs contested the ruling as 
contrary to a statute barring bank service corporations 
from engaging in "any activity other than the performance 
of bank services for banks." Id. at 155, 90 S. Ct. at 831 
(citation omitted). Holding that the plaintiffs had standing, 
the Court explained the zone of interests test as follows: 
"[W]hether the interest sought to be protected by the 
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question." Id. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 830. 
 
Subsequently, in Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n., 479 
U.S. 388, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987), the Supreme Court 
provided further guidance as to the contours of the zone of 
interests test. In Clarke, the Court held that a trade 
association of securities brokers had standing to challenge 
a decision by the Comptroller that national banks could 
operate discount brokerage services in locations outside of 
their home states. Id. at 394-403, 107 S. Ct. at 754-59. 
Analyzing the zone of interests test, the Court explained 
that "[t]he essential inquiry is whether Congress intended 
for [a particular] class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon to 
 
                                8 
challenge agency disregard of the law." Id. at 399, 107 S. 
Ct. at 757 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The 
Court then proceeded to state: 
 
In cases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of 
the contested regulatory action, the [zone of interests] 
test denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests 
are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the 
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot 
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to 
permit the suit. The test is not meant to be especially 
demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of 
congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff. 
 
Id. at 399-400, 107 S. Ct. at 757 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).7 
 
Most recently, in Bennett v. Spear, the Supreme Court 
revisited the zone of interests test in the context of 
determining whether two Oregon irrigation districts, which 
had competing economic and other interests in water from 
the Klamath Irrigation Project, had standing to seek judicial 
review of a "Biological Opinion" issued by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service. 117 S. Ct. at 1159-60 (1997). The districts 
challenged the Biological Opinion under both the citizen- 
suit provision of the Endangered Species Act and the APA. 
Id. at 1159. In their complaint, the districts alleged that the 
restrictions on water delivery recommended by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The zone of interests test is most often described in terms of standing 
to challenge regulatory or agency actions because the principal cases in 
which the test has been applied are those involving claims brought 
under § 702 of the Administrative Procedures Act. Nonetheless, in Clarke 
the Court explicitly acknowledged that variations of the zone of interests 
test were applicable in other contexts and that the Court had itself 
previously listed the zone of interests inquiry among general prudential 
considerations bearing on standing. 479 U.S. at 400 n.16, 107 S. Ct. at 
757 n.16. Most recently, the Court has reaffirmed that the test applies 
to suits not involving review of federal administrative action and that 
"the breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the provisions of 
law at issue, so that what comes within the zone of interests of a statute 
for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative action under 
the generous review provisions of the APA may not do so for other 
purposes." Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
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Biological Opinion would "adversely affect plaintiffs by 
substantially reducing the quantity of available irrigation 
water" used by the districts. Id. at 1160. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that "only 
plaintiffs who allege an interest in the preservation of 
endangered species fall within the zone of interests 
protected by the ESA." Id. (quoting Bennett v. Plenert, 63 
F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Court reversed, holding 
that the broad language of the EPA's citizen-suit provision 
stating that "any person may commence a civil suit," 
negated the zone-of interests test and expanded standing 
under the EPA to non-environmentalists like the petitioners 
in the instant action. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162-63. 
Significantly, the Court also held that the districts had 
standing to seek judicial review of the Biological Opinion 
under the APA because their economic interests were 
within the zone of interests that section 7 of the ESA, 16 
U.S.C. § 1536, was intended to protect. Id. at 1167-68. 
 
In reaching its decision, the Court reviewed its 
jurisprudence regarding the zone of interests test and 
reaffirmed its determination that the test was applicable to 
suits not involving review of federal administrative action. 
Id. at 1161. The Court further emphasized that the breadth 
of the zone of interests test varied according to the 
provisions of law at issue. Id. Moreover, the Court specified 
that "[w]hether a plaintiff's interest is`arguably . . . 
protected . . . by the statute' within the meaning of the zone 
of interests test is to be determined not by reference to the 
overall purpose of the Act in question . . . but by reference 
to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff 
relies." Id. at 1167. 
 
Significantly, nothing in the Bennett opinion, or its 
analysis of the zone of interests test therein, indicates that 
the Court has retreated from its assertion in Clarke that the 
zone of interests test is "not meant to be especially 
demanding." Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S. Ct. at 757.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Indeed, the furthest step the Court has ever taken to specifically limit 
the breadth of the "zone of interests" test in the APA context occurred in 
Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 
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C. 
 
We have applied the zone of interests test consistent with 
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. For example, in 
Schering Corp. v. Food and Drug Admin., 51 F.3d 390 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 274 (1995), we considered 
whether a competing drug manufacturer concerned about 
losing profits had standing to maintain an action against 
the FDA under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984. Although the manufacturer was 
not the direct subject of the regulatory action it sought to 
challenge, we were persuaded that the manufacturer's 
competitive interests were consistent with the dual 
congressional purposes of the Act: (1) aiding generic drug 
competition; and (2) preserving the safety of commercial 
drugs. Schering Corp., 51 F.3d at 395-96. Significantly, in 
determining that the manufacturer had standing to bring 
its action against the FDA, we described the zone of 
interests test as follows: 
 
When, as here, the plaintiff is not itself subject to the 
challenged agency action, the zone of interests test 
denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are 
only marginally related to the purpose of the statute. 
The test, however, is not so stringent that it requires the 
would-be plaintiff to be specifically targeted by 
Congress as a beneficiary of the statute. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
530, 111 S. Ct. 913, 921 (1991), where the Court held that there must 
be an "integral relationship" between the statutory provisions plaintiffs 
claim have been violated and the provisions under which plaintiffs claim 
standing. This "integral relationship" requirement, however, only 
necessitates that "the plaintiff must establish that the injury he 
complains of . . . falls within the `zone of interests' sought to be protected 
by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his 
complaint." Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1167 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990)). 
 
Importantly, this circuit has expressly held that the Air Courier 
decision does not establish a "strict zone of interests test contrary to 
previous Supreme Court precedent, such as Clarke  . . . ." UPS 
Worldwide, 66 F.3d at 630 n.11. 
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Id. at 395 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We thus 
indicated that the zone of interests test is not to be applied 
"stringently" in order to deny standing. 
 
We also endorsed a "liberal" application of the zone of 
interests test in UPS Worldwide, where we considered the 
question of whether a private parcel service had standing to 
challenge the International Customized Mail (ICM) service 
offered by the U.S. Post Office. The private competitor 
alleged that the service violated the Postal Reorganization 
Act, which regulated postal and other rates for mail 
transported between the United States and other countries. 
We concluded that the prerequisites of standing had been 
met, reasoning that an "integral relationship" existed 
among the relevant statutes relied upon by the private 
carrier and that "the history of the Postal Service 
demonstrates that Congress understood that statutes 
setting postal rates were inextricably linked with those 
governing the postal monopoly." Id. at 630-31. 
 
Importantly, in the UPS Worldwide opinion we devoted 
significant attention to the standards underlying the zone of 
interests test. We first traced the development of the test 
through the Supreme Court's decisions in Data Processing 
and Clarke. 66 F.3d at 628-29. We next noted that the Air 
Courier decision, which added the "integral relationship" 
requirement to the zone of interests test, had suggested a 
somewhat stricter test. Id. at 629. We then concluded that 
the Air Courier decision had done nothing to change the 
underlying nature of the zone of interests test, opining that 
the decision had "merely held that a recodification of an 
entire title of the United States Code, covering hundreds of 
statutory provisions developed over the course of two 
centuries, did not constitute one `statute' within the 
meaning of the zone of interests test." Id. at 630 n.11. 
Distinguishing Air Courier in this manner, we proceeded to 
reaffirm that plaintiffs need not be among the intended 
beneficiaries of the statute under which they are suing in 
order to satisfy the zone of interests test. Id. at 630 
(citations omitted). Our opinion also explicitly rejected the 
idea that the test was intended to be a strict one. Id. at 630 
n.11. In so doing, we again cited the Supreme Court's 
statement in Clarke that the zone of interests test "is not 
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meant to be especially demanding." Id. (citing Clarke, 479 




This takes us to the central question before us: whether 
the Davises are asserting claims that arguably fall within 
the scope of interests intended to be protected by Congress 
when it enacted the Lead Act.9 The most relevant portion of 
the Lead Act to the this case is 42 U.S.C. § 4822 -- 
"Requirements for housing receiving Federal assistance." 
Subsection (a)(1) of § 4822 states in pertinent part: 
 
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development . . . 
shall establish procedures to eliminate as far as 
practicable the hazards of lead based paint poisoning 
with respect to any existing housing which may 
present such hazards and which is covered by an 
application for mortgage insurance or housing 
assistance payments under a program administered by 
the Secretary or otherwise receives more than $5,000 
in project-based assistance under a Federal Housing 
program. 
 
Relying on this statutory language, the district court 
concluded that "[b]ecause Plaintiffs are not participants in 
the Section 8 housing assistance program, their interests 
are not consistent with the purposes implicit in the statute 
at issue." Davis, 1996 WL 377189, at *3. The district court, 
however, overlooked the legislative history of § 4822(a)(1) 
and interpreted the statutory provision at issue too 
narrowly for purposes of the zone of interests test. 
 
The present § 4822(a)(1) was added to the Lead Act as 
part of a group of amendments to the Act passed in 1973. 
As the legislative history explains, the amendments were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. It is clear that an "integral relationship" exists between the statutory 
provisions the Davises claim have been violated and the provisions under 
which they claim standing. Indeed, the Davises assert standing under 
the same statutory provisions that they claim have been violated -- 
under the Lead Act for their § 1983 claims, and under the United States 
Housing Act and the Lead Act for their private right of action and breach 
of contract claims. 
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not intended to alter the principal purposes of the Lead Act 
which were, inter alia, "to eliminate childhood lead based 
paint poisoning by screening, and testing young children 
for high blood levels," and "to determine the most effective 
means for removing the hazards of lead poisoning in those 
residences that present a high risk to the health of young 
children." S. Rep. No. 93-130 (1973), reprinted in 1973 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2403, 2404. Instead, the amendments were 
intended to "ensure that fundamental improvements 
[would] be developed in lead poisoning programs," and to 
provide the federal agencies responsible for these programs 
with increased appropriations to implement and coordinate 
the desired programs. 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2405-06. 
 
More specifically, the Senate Report emphasized that the 
particular amendments related to federal housing, 
including the provisions of § 4822(a)(1), were influenced by 
the belief that "it does no good to hospitalize a child for lead 
sickness and after treatment, return him to the same 
conditions that caused the disease in the first place." Id. at 
2406. The Report also recognized that "once a child has 
suffered the damage caused by lead poisoning, he is quite 
likely to get sick again unless the lead paint poisoning 
hazard is eliminated in his home and environment." Id. 
These observations in turn persuaded Congress to increase 
the authorization of funding "for programs to eliminate the 
hazards of lead paint based poisoning," as established 
under the terms of § 4822(a)(1). Significantly, the housing 
amendments, along with the other 1973 amendments, were 
passed with the following summary statement included as 
part of the Senate Report: 
 
In summary, the committee cannot overemphasize that 
the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act has two 
primary purposes. First, the Act is designed to 
eliminate the hazards caused by existing lead-based 
paint. At the same time the Act is intended to begin 
providing resources to support programs that will 
search out those youngsters already sickened by lead 
poisoning so that they may receive medical attention. If 
full scale programs can be inaugurated to accomplish 
the two goals, we will be well along the way to 
achieving a significant health objective. 
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Lead-based paint poisoning manifests itself as a critical 
threat to millions of Americans, particularly young 
children. And, as such, this malady is the direct result 
of an environmental pollutant. Since we have the 
technology to eliminate the pollutant and to halt the 
damaging effects of the disease the committee strongly 
supports measures to curb the spread of this disease. 
There is no question that we know how to protect 
America's children from lead-based paint poisoning. 
The committee agrees that now we must begin to do 
that. 
 
1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2411. 
 
The broad scope of both the Lead Act and the 1973 
amendments, and the Senate Report's focus on the need for 
the permanent elimination of hazards caused by lead-based 
paint, suggests that Congress intended more than just 
children living in housing presently receiving federal 
funding to reap the benefits of a lead-free residential 
environment. As the legislative history demonstrates, 
Congress understood that the permanent removal of lead- 
based paint hazards from the nation's housing stock was 
vital to ensure that children were not constantly exposed 
and reexposed to the harms associated with lead-based 
paint poisoning. 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2405-06. As such, it 
seems clear to us that by requiring HUD to establish 
procedures to eliminate lead-based hazards in residences 
receiving federal funding "as far as practicable," Congress 
intended the lead-based paint hazards to be permanently 
removed, not abated for only that period of time during 
which the residence was part of federally funded housing 
program. From this perspective, it is arguable that 
Congress expected all children who lived in a residence that 
was at one time subject to the lead hazard removal 
requirements of the Lead Act and § 4822(a)(1) to be 
beneficiaries of the statutory scheme. 
 
Moreover, although the case law is sparse, a number of 
courts have held that tenants in federally subsidized 
residences possess cognizable rights under the Lead Act 
and that they may sue local housing authorities to enforce 
its provisions. See, e.g., Ashton v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 56, 66- 
67 (D.C. Cir.), as amended, 723 F.2d 70 (1983); German v. 
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Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 885 F.Supp. 537, 577 
(S.D.N.Y.), as clarified, 896 F.Supp. 1385 (1995); Hurt v. 
Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 806 F. Supp. 515, 525-26 
(E.D.Pa. 1992). Given that the primary benefit Congress 
intended these tenants to enjoy under the Lead Act was the 
permanent elimination of lead-based paint hazards, we are 
persuaded that tenants who come to live in these 
residences after the benefit has already supposedly 
accrued, (e.g., the lead hazard has been "eliminated as far 
as practicable"), could at least arguably be considered 
intended beneficiaries of the statutory and regulatory 
scheme imposed by the Lead Act and its implementing 
regulations. Under this view, "successor tenants" like 
Jonathan Davis would fall squarely under the broad zone of 
interests that Congress intended to protect with the Lead 
Act and § 4822(a)(1) -- the rights of children to live in 
residences where lead-based paint hazards have been 
"eliminated as far as practicable." 
 
Further, even if the Davises could not arguably be 
considered intended beneficiaries of the statutory scheme 
created under the Lead Act and § 4822(a)(1), they may still 
qualify under the zone of interests test. Under the zone of 
interests test there is no requirement that the Davises be 
among the intended beneficiaries of the statute under 
which they are suing in order to satisfy the test. See, e.g., 
UPS Worldwide, 66 F.3d at 630 (citations omitted); 
Schering, 51 F.3d at 395 (citations omitted). Indeed, there 
are a number of factors that suggest to us that the Davises 
satisfy the zone of interests test notwithstanding the 
argument that they are not intended beneficiaries of the 
Lead Act or § 4822(a)(1). First, the Davises assert claims for 
damages that are closely related to the purposes of the 
Lead Act and § 4822(a)(1). See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 
S. Ct. at 757 (plaintiff does not meet zone of interests test 
if his "interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent 
with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot 
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit 
the suit."). In this respect, the Davises allege that Jonathan 
suffered permanent injuries from lead-based paint hazards 
that should have been discovered and abated at an earlier 
time. Since two of the primary purposes of the Lead Act 
and the 1973 amendments are to permanently eliminate 
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lead-based paint hazards from the nation's housing and "to 
protect America's children from lead-based paint 
poisoning," there seems to be a close correlation between 
the interests of the Davises and the purposes intended to 
be served by these statutory provisions. 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 2411. Second, granting the Davises standing to pursue 
their claims would not interfere with enforcement of the 
statutory and regulatory scheme created under the Lead 
Act. In fact, permitting these claims to go forward would 
only encourage greater enforcement of the inspection and 
abatement duties imposed on local public housing 
authorities under the Act. Finally, given that the zone of 
interests test is "not meant to be especially demanding," 
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S. Ct. at 757, it is difficult to 
conclude that the rights asserted by the Davises do not 
satisfy the liberal standards of the test. As noted above, the 
Davises are asserting claims closely related to the purposes 
and the statutory scheme of the Lead Act and there is no 
question that their specific individual rights, as opposed to 
generalized grievances, would be vindicated by permitting 
the suit to go forward. Collectively, these factors are clearly 





In summary, we believe the legislative history of the Lead 
Act and, more specifically, § 4822(a)(1), makes it clear that 
the Davis's rights were arguably within the zone of interests 
that Congress intended to protect under the statute. 
Moreover, even if the Davises cannot be considered 
intended beneficiaries of the statutory and regulatory 
scheme created under the Lead Act, they have alleged 
violations of rights that are closely related to the interests 
intended to be protected by the Lead Act and § 4822(a)(1), 
and hence, we conclude their claims are sufficient to satisfy 
the zone of interests test and to establish prudential 
standing. Accordingly, we will reverse and remand the 
cause to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Davises have also requested that we reinstate their pendant 
state law claims against Miriam Shaw which were dismissed pursuant to 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent because I believe the majority has 
committed two errors in its analysis. First, it has 
insufficiently recognized the distinction in standing 
jurisprudence between administrative review cases and 
private right of action cases, such as this one. Second, the 
majority has not adequately considered the statutory 
language of both the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention 
Act ("LPPPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4822(a)(1), and the Residential 
Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 ("Title X"), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 4851 et seq. Read together, the language of 
these statutes demonstrates that Congress intended that 
the LPPPA would not benefit the Davises. While the 
majority correctly observes that one asserting standing 
need not show that Congress intended to benefit him, I 
believe that when Congress has expressly indicated its 
intent not to benefit a particular plaintiff, the standing 




As the majority notes, the question for determination is 
" `whether the interest sought to be protected by the 
[Davises] is arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question.' " 
Bennett v. Spear, ___ U.S. ___, #6D 6D6D#, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1161 
(1997) (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830 (1970)) 
(alterations added); see Majority slip op. at 18. The majority 
makes much of the statement by the Court in Clarke v. 
Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S.Ct. 750, 
757 (1987), that "[t]he test is not meant to be especially 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
a separate order of the district court dated July 24, 1996. After reviewing 
the district court's order, we are uncertain as to whether the court 
dismissed these claims because it determined that it lacked jurisdiction 
after having dismissed the Davis's federal claims against the Housing 
Authority or rather because the Davises chose not to pursue their claims 
against Miriam Shaw. Accordingly, on remand the district court should 
reexamine its dismissal of the pendant state law claims in light of our 
holding that the Davises have standing to pursue their federal claims 
against the Housing Authority. 
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demanding." The majority emphasizes this passage from 
Clarke, see Majority slip op. at 9, and repeats it no less 
than three times, see id. at 10, 12-13, 17. 
 
Importantly, Clarke, from which the "not . . . especially 
demanding" language derives, was a case in which the 
plaintiff sought review of federal administrative action, 
specifically a ruling by the Comptroller of Currency. See 
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 390, 107 S.Ct. at 752. Indeed, every 
opinion used by the majority to guide it in its application of 
the zone-of-interests analysis was an administrative review 
case. See Bennett, ___ U.S. at #6D6D 6D#, 117 S.Ct. at 1158 
(challenge to ruling by Fish and Wildlife Service); Air Courier 
Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Union, 
498 U.S. 517, 519-20, 111 S.Ct. 913, 915-16 (1991) 
(challenge to promulgation of regulations by U.S. Postal 
Service); Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151, 90 S.Ct. at 829 
(action challenging ruling by Comptroller of Currency); UPS 
Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 66 
F.3d 621, 623 (3d Cir. 1995) (challenge to promulgation of 
regulations by U.S. Postal Service), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 116 S.Ct. 1261 (1996); Schering Corp. v. Food and Drug 
Admin., 51 F.3d 390, 391-92 (3d Cir.) (action challenging 
FDA approval of drug), cert. denied, #6D 6D6D# U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 
274 (1995). 
 
This case, by stark contrast, is not an administrative 
review case. The Davises assert that they have a private 
right of action against the PHA pursuant to § 1983 and the 
LPPPA. As some commentators have recognized, the 
Supreme Court has strongly implied that "plaintiffs in 
[private right of action] cases have to meet a higher 
threshold test in showing that judicial protection of their 
interests is intended by the statute in question." William A. 
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Y ALE L.J. 221, 237 
n.84 (1988). Indeed, the unanimous Supreme Court 
recently reiterated the important idea, stemming from 
Clarke, that "what comes within the zone of interests of a 
statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of 
administrative action under the ` " `generous review 
provisions' " ' of the APA [Administrative Procedures Act] 
may not do so for other purposes." Bennett, ___ U.S. at ___, 
117 S.Ct. at 1161 (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16, 
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107 S.Ct. at 757 n.16 (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 
156, 90 S.Ct. at 831)); see also Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 
n.16, 107 S.Ct. at 757 n.16. ("While inquiries into 
reviewability or prudential standing in other contexts may 
bear some resemblance to a `zone of interest' inquiry under 
the APA, it is not a test of universal application."). By 
contrast to its emphasis on the "not . . . especially 
demanding" language, the majority relegates this important 
concept to a footnote. See Majority slip op. at 9 n.7. 
 
The two private right of action cases in which the 
Supreme Court has applied zone-of-interests analysis give 
only limited guidance. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 
449, 111 S.Ct. 865, 872 (1991); Boston Stock Exchange v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3, 97 S.Ct. 599, 
602-03 n.3 (1977). In addition, I am unaware of, and the 
majority has not cited, any private right of action case from 
this Court offering any extensive zone-of-interest analysis. 
That is not to say that we have not applied the analysis in 
non-agency review situations. When we have done so, 
however, the party whose standing was in question clearly 
satisfied the zone-of-interests test and we therefore declined 
to engage in any extensive analysis. See, e.g., In re Grand 
Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1072 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The privacy 
interests the [intervenors] assert are certainly within the 
`zone of interests' that Title III [of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968] is intended to 
protect."); Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 931 (3d Cir. 
1996) ("[A]s the target of [National Security Agency] 
regulatory action, [plaintiff's] interests fall within the zone 
of interests protected by the constitutional and regulatory 
provisions on which her case is based."); Out Front Prods., 
Inc. v. Magid, 748 F.2d 166, 168 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[I]t is clear 
that businesses that are hindered from forming or from 
entering a new market come within the zone of interests 
protected by the antitrust laws . . . ."); American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 
283, 303 n.21 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[I]ncreased cost [of 
insurance] caused by a [statutory] provision directed at 
[plaintiff] . . . places her within the zone of interests of the 
regulation"), aff'd, 476 U.S. 747, 106 S.Ct. 2169 (1986). 
 
                                20 
The Clarke Court did give some guidance as to the 
appropriate application of the zone-of-interests test in a 
private right of action case. It wrote: 
 
The difference made by the APA can be readily seen by 
comparing the "zone of interest" [jurisprudence] with 
cases in which a private right of action under a statute 
is asserted in conditions that make the APA 
inapplicable. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 
S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Cannon v. University 
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 
560 (1979). 
 
Id. at 400 n.16, 107 S.Ct. at 758 n.16; see Fletcher, supra, 
at 237 n.84. The reference to Cort and Cannon is somewhat 
cryptic. The issue in those cases was whether a particular 
statute granted anyone the right to relief, while in this case, 
the issue is, assuming arguendo that someone is entitled to 
relief, whether the Davises are within that class of 
individuals. As we have explained, the former question goes 
to whether a cause of action exists (i.e., a question going to 
the merits) while the latter is a question of standing. See 
Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1151 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1982); Majority slip op. at 4-5. But see David P. Currie, 
Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 43 
(arguing that the two issues are identical); Fletcher, supra, 
at 236-37 (same). 
 
In any event, I will not further attempt to articulate the 
zone-of-interest analysis to be applied in "cases in which a 
private right of action under a statute is asserted in 
conditions that make the APA inapplicable." Clarke, 479 
U.S. at 400 n.16, 107 S.Ct. at 758 n.16. Perhaps the 
difference in approach is largely inarticulable except to say 
that the test in a private right of action case is more 
stringent. Further guidance from the Supreme Court on 
this topic would, of course, be helpful. Suffice it to say that 
the majority imposes a test that is "not . . . especially 




1. The prudential standing requirements "are`founded in concern about 
the proper -- and properly limited -- role of the courts in a democratic 
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II. 
 
The second error committed by the majority is its reliance 
on the legislative history of the LPPPA to the exclusion of 
the language of both the LPPPA and Title X. This language 
demonstrates Congress's intent that individuals in the 
Davises' position not be benefited by the LPPPA. The 
Supreme Court has written that it is not necessary that 
"there be [any] indication of congressional purpose to 
benefit the would-be plaintiff " in order for that plaintiff to 
meet the zone-of-interests test. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399- 
400, 107 S.Ct. at 757. We have reiterated this view. See 
Schering, 51 F.3d at 395. However, a plaintiff does not meet 
the zone-of-interests requirement if his "interests are so 
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes 
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed 
that Congress intended to permit the suit." Clarke, 479 U.S. 
at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757 (emphasis added). In other words, 
while lack of congressional intent to benefit a particular 
plaintiff will not be fatal to his claim of standing, a 
demonstration of congressional intent not to benefit him 
will be. 
 
In order to answer the zone-of-interests question, it is 
crucial that we examine the language of "the statutory 
provision whose violation forms the legal basis for [the] 
complaint." Bennett, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 1167 
(emphasis omitted). As the majority notes, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4822(a)(1) provides, in part: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
society." Bennett v. Spear, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997) 
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 
(1975)). I concede that, given this concern, it is somewhat 
counterintuitive that plaintiffs seeking to enforce a private right of action 
should be subject to a more stringent zone-of-interests test than those 
plaintiffs seeking review of administrative agency action. One would 
assume that a plaintiff in the latter type of case, having the opportunity 
to challenge agency action through the political branches of government, 
would be subject to the more stringent requirement. Nonetheless, we are 
bound by language in Supreme Court precedent indicating that a more 
stringent zone-of-interests test is applicable in non-agency review cases. 
See Bennett, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 1161; Clarke v. Securities 
Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16, 107 S.Ct. 750, 758 n.16 (1987)." 
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The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development . . . 
shall establish procedures to eliminate as far as 
practicable the hazards of lead based paint poisoning 
with respect to any existing housing which may 
present such hazards and which is covered by an 
application for mortgage insurance or housing 
assistance payments under a program administered by 
the Secretary or otherwise receives more than $5000 in 





I will assume that the majority is correct in concluding 
that this language, standing alone, does not demonstrate 
Congress's intent to protect only participants in the section 
8 housing assistance program. However, this language does 
not stand alone. It must be read together with other 
relevant language in the statutory scheme that Congress 
has established. In discerning the meaning of the particular 
provision under which the Davises sue, we are free to 
"consider any provision that helps us to understand 
Congress' overall purposes." Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401, 107 
S.Ct. at 758; see also id. at 396-97, 107 S.Ct. at 755 
(noting that Data Processing Court relied on one statute to 
find plaintiffs suing under different statute had standing). 
 
Totally absent from the majority's discussion is any 
mention of Title X. Title X was enacted in 1992 pursuant to 
Congress's findings that low level lead poisoning, commonly 
caused by ingesting lead-based paint, was a problem of 
national significance, affecting as many as 3 million 
children under the age of six. See 42 U.S.C. § 4851(1), (4). 
Congress found that lead-based paint hazards 
predominated in housing built before 1980, and that as 
many as 3.8 million American homes contained these 
hazards. See 42 U.S.C. § 4851(3), (5). 
 
Significantly, Congress did not limit the scope of Title X 
to housing having some connection to the federal 
government. Rather, unlike the LPPPA, the statute seeks "to 
eliminate lead-based paint hazards in all housing." 42 
U.S.C. § 4851a(1) (emphasis added); see  Jane Schukoske, 
The Evolving Paradigm of Laws on Lead-Based Paint: From 
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Code Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REV. 
511, 545 (1994); Brett P. Barragate, Note, Time for 
Legislative Action: Landlord Liability in Ohio for Lead 
Poisoning of a Tenant, 43 CLEV. S T. L. REV. 529, 535-36 
(1995); Karla A. Francken, Comment, Lead-Based Paint 
Poisoning Liability: Wisconsin Realtors, Residential Property 
Sellers, and Landlords Beware, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 550, 581 
(1994); Jennifer Tiller, Recent Development, Easing Lead 
Paint Laws: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 18 H ARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1994). Perhaps more significantly, 
Congress justified the enactment of the more 
comprehensive Title X in the following terms: "[D]espite the 
enactment of laws in the early 1970's requiring the Federal 
Government to eliminate as far as practicable lead-based 
paint hazards in federally owned, assisted, and insured 
housing [i.e., the LPPPA], the Federal response to this 
national crisis remains severely limited." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4851(7); see also Schukoske, supra, at 545; Tiller, supra, 
at 266-67. 
 
With regard to private housing, Title X has three major 
effects. First, it requires disclosure to prospective tenants 
and buyers of private housing of the hazards of lead-based 
paint in general, and of any known hazards regarding the 
property in question. See 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(a)(1), (3); 
Schukoske, supra, at 548-49; Barragate, supra, at 536; 
Francken, supra, at 580-83. Violation of the disclosure 
provisions results in civil liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(b); 
Barragate, supra, at 537; Francken, supra, at 583. Second, 
Title X "establishes a task force to make recommendations 
to [the Environmental Protection Agency] regarding the 
feasibility of assessment of lead-based paint hazards 
throughout the real estate finance system." Schukoske, 
supra, at 549; see 42 U.S.C. § 4852a(c)(1)-(3); Barragate, 
supra, at 536. The task force also has the responsibility of 
"recommend[ing] liability standards for landlords and 
lenders . . . and propos[ing] ways to increase availability of 
insurance coverage for contractors and alternative 
compensation systems for poisoning victims." Schukoske, 
supra, at 549-50; see 42 U.S.C. § 4852a(c)(6), (7). Finally, 
Title X provides for the development of standards for the 
abatement of lead-based paint in residential housing, but 
largely "leaves to the states the task of developing 
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standards and statutory schemes on lead paint." 
Schukoske, supra, at 547-48; see 15 U.S.C. § 2682(c)(1). 
 
Examination of the LPPPA and Title X together 
demonstrates that this case is wholly unlike those cases 
upon which the majority relies. Each of those cases 
involved "[p]laintiffs who suffer[ed] economic injury from 
unlawful competition" alleged to be prohibited by " `entry 
restricting' statutes.' " Schering, 51 F.3d at 395. 
Accordingly, in those cases, "the plaintiff's interests in 
protecting its competitive position . . . coincide[d] with the 
legislative purpose of imposing an entry restriction." Id.; see 
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403, 107 S.Ct. at 759; Data Processing, 
397 U.S. at 155-56, 90 S.Ct. at 831; UPS Worldwide, 66 
F.3d at 630-31. Thus, it was at least "arguable" that the 
furtherance of the plaintiff's interest in each of those cases 
was one beneficial side effect implicit in the legislation in 
question, even if it was not the purpose contemplated by 
Congress. 
 
Here, by contrast, the plaintiffs' interests do not 
"coincide," but instead conflict, with the purpose of the 
statute pursuant to which they bring their action. Congress 
has enacted two statutes that, read together, demonstrate 
that Congress sought to protect the interests of those in 
plaintiffs' position by only one of those statutes. Yet the 
majority finds that the Davises have standing to assert 
rights under the other statutory provision. The majority 
thereby fails to heed the Supreme Court's instruction that 
the interests of a plaintiff asserting standing must not be 
"inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute." 
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757. 
 
This result is not only perplexing but is also at odds with 
our system of separation of powers and our tradition of 
judicial restraint. Congress, through the give-and-take of 
the political process that resulted in the enactment of the 
LPPPA and Title X, has created a framework that delicately 
balances the competing interests of those exposed to the 
hazards of lead-based paint and those who have the power 
to abate or eliminate those hazards. True, Title X might not 
protect residents of private housing to the same extent that 
the LPPPA protects residents of federally-owned and 
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-assisted housing. However, that the Congress chose to 
strike a somewhat different balance in each context is none 
of our concern -- it is a policy choice that Congress was 
entitled to make. We are in no position to upset with an 
expansive view of the zone-of-interests test the delicate 
balance that Congress has wrought. That is precisely what 
the prudential standing requirements were designed to 
obviate. See Bennett, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 1161; In 




I agree with the majority on one crucial point: nothing in 
the Court's opinion should be construed to mean that the 
Davises have a cause of action against the PHA. See 
Majority slip op. at 4-5. But see id. at 15-16 (citing cases 
that hold that tenants in federally-assisted housing may 
sue to enforce LPPPA as support for unrelated proposition 
that Davises possess standing). The majority merely holds 
that the Davises' interests are "arguably within the zone of 
interests sought to be protected by" the LPPPA. Data 
Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 830 (emphasis 
added). Should the PHA wish to file a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the questions for the 
district court will become whether the Davises' interests are 
actually within that zone, see Chem Serv., Inc. v. 
Environmental Monitoring Sys. Laboratory-Cincinnati , 12 
F.3d 1256, 1263 (3d Cir. 1993), and whether a private right 




Because I do not agree with the majority that the Davises' 
interests are even "arguably within the zone of interests" 
the LPPPA seeks to protect, I respectfully dissent. 
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